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ABSTRACT 
This study examines whether isomorphic behavior by multinational corporations positively or 
negatively affect the performance of foreign subsidiaries. Although previous studies find that 
multinational corporations have a tendency to mimic practices adopted by other firms, the 
financial consequences of mimetic behavior remains uncovered. This study addresses 
multinational corporations' isomorphic behavior regarding foreign subsidiary staffing and 
hypothesizes the relationship between the imitation of the dominant practice for subsidiary 
staffing and the subsidiary performance. The panel dataset consisting of 3,284 foreign 
subsidiaries of multinational corporations are used to test the hypotheses. The results 
obtained from a fixed effect model indicate that the imitation of the dominant practice 
adopted in the host country negatively affects the subsidiary performance. This study also 
finds that the negative relationship between mimetic behavior and subsidiary performance 
becomes greater as the institutional distance between the host country and the home country 
increases. The results of this study suggest that isomorphic behavior in pursuit of legitimacy 
is accompanied by the loss of efficiency.  
Key words: isomorphism; legitimacy; foreign subsidiary staffing; subsidiary performance; 
institutional distance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Institutional theory has been employed to understand how sociological factors constrain 
behavior of individuals and organizations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; North, 1990; Scott, 
2008). Institutional theorists are interested in explaining the convergence and the resultant 
uniformity of organizational structures and practices (Roberts and Greenwood, 1997). A 
primary contention of institutional theory is that organizations are subject to a set of 
sociological pressures (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 2008). Sociological pressures 
force organizations to adopt structures and practices that are perceived to be appropriate 
within the social context where they are embedded (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 
2008). By adopting appropriate structures and practices, organizations can acquire legitimacy 
in the society (Björkman, Fey, and Park, 2007; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 2008). 
Because social acceptance and legitimacy increases the probability of their survival, 
organizations sharing the same social context employ similar structures and practices 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Martinez and Dacin, 1999.). As a result, organizations in the 
same society become isomorphic with one another (Barreto and Baden-Fuller, 2006; 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
Applying institutional theory to analysis of multinational corporations (MNCs) entering 
foreign markets, previous studies on international business explored MNCs' isomorphic 
behavior. For example, Salomon and Wu (2012) showed that foreign banks mimic the asset 
strategy of local competitors. Yiu and Makino (2002) also showed that manufacturers 
engaged in home-electronics and automobile industries imitate entry mode choice adopted by 
counterparts from the same home country. These studies showed under which conditions 
MNCs imitate practices and decisions of other firms. However, few studies examined the 
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consequences of isomorphic behavior (Barreto and Baden-Fuller, 2006; Westphal, Gulati, and 
Shortell, 1997). It is still uncovered whether imitation of behavior and practices of other firms 
enhances or deteriorates the performance of MNCs. Mimicking practices that are adopted by 
other organizations within the social context helps the focal organization gain legitimacy in 
the society (Deephouse, 1996, 2005). Although this behavior is considered normatively 
rational (Oliver, 1997), normatively rational behavior is not always equivalent to 
economically rational behavior. We still do not have adequate knowledge about the effect of 
isomorphic behavior by MNCs on their performance in host countries. We need to explore 
whether normatively rational behavior is economically rational and in which situations 
isomorphic behavior positively or negatively affects the performance of MNCs. To explore 
these questions, this study proposes that legitimacy seeking through isomorphic behavior is 
accompanied by the cost to gain legitimacy. This study focuses on MNCs' isomorphic 
behavior regarding a staffing practice for foreign subsidiaries and examines how adoption of 
the staffing practice prevailing in the host country affects the performance of foreign 
subsidiaries. Among staffing practices for foreign subsidiaries, this study investigates the 
ratio of parent country nationals (PCN) to subsidiary employees (the PCN ratio) because it is 
the most studied practice in previous studies (Gaur, Delios, and Singh, 2007; Gong, 2003; 
Tan and Mahoney, 2006). 
This study organized as follows. The next section reviews the literature on institutional 
theory and isomorphic behavior as well as studies that analyzed isomorphic behavior by 
MNCs. Then, the hypotheses explaining the relationship between isomorphic behavior 
regarding foreign subsidiary staffing and subsidiary performance are developed. The 
hypotheses are tested using a panel dataset consisting of 3,284 foreign subsidiaries of MNCs. 
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After reporting the results of the empirical analysis, the implications, as well as limitations 
and directions for future research, are discussed. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Institutional theory assumes that firms' behavior is constrained by a set of institutional 
pressures from the society as they are embedded in the social context (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983; Scott, 1995). Institutional pressures force firms to adopt organizational practices and 
structures that are perceived to be appropriate within the social context (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; Salomon and Wu, 2012; Scott, 2008). Institutions are defined as the rules of 
the game in a society, or the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction (North 
1990). Institutions provide guidelines and resources for taking action as well as prohibitions 
and constraints on action (Scott, 2008). Organizational practices that conform to requirements 
from institutions are perceived to be socially appropriate and accepted. By taking socially 
appropriate action, firms can gain legitimacy within the institutional context (Scott, 2008). 
Firms seek to gain legitimacy by adopting socially appropriate practices and increase the 
probability of their survival (Björkman et al., 2007; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 2008). 
Legitimacy-seeking behavior by firms in the society results in the adoption of similar 
practices and the imitation of other firms' practices (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). A tendency 
to take mimetic behavior strengthens when firms operate in uncertain and ambiguous 
environments (Deephouse, 1996; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Salomon and Wu, 2012). In 
uncertainty, firms have difficulty taking economically rational action (Haunschild and Miner, 
1997). Instead, firms mimic dominant practices and strategies, which provides them with 
legitimacy and increases the likelihood of survival in uncertain environments (Chan, Makino 
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and Isobe, 2006; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995; Yiu and Makino, 2002).  
Based on these arguments, previous studies examined how MNCs imitate other firms' 
practices and adopt socially appropriate practices when they enter and operate in host 
countries. Guillén (2002) conducted a longitudinal analysis of South Korean firms entering 
into China and found that behavior of firms belonging to the same business group and firms 
belonging to the same industry influences a firm's decisions on entry into China. Using a data 
of Japanese firms, Henisz and Delios (2001) found that when Japanese firms make a decision 
on international plant location, they imitate the past decision by other Japanese firms. They 
also found that Japanese firms with less host country experience tend to imitate the past 
international expansion decisions of other Japanese firms (Henisz and Delios, 2001). Several 
studies examined isomorphic behavior of MNCs regarding entry mode choice. For example, 
Chan and Makino (2007) used a dataset of Japanese firms and found that Japanese firms 
imitate other Japanese firms when they decide the level of the ownership stake in the foreign 
subsidiary. They also found that this tendency strengthens as political instability of the host 
country increases (Chan and Makino, 2007). By using a dataset of foreign direct investment 
in China, Xia, Tan, and Tan (2008) showed that selection by foreign entrants of equity joint 
venture is affected by industry peers from the same home country and the same host country. 
Salomon and Wu (2012) used a dataset of foreign banks in the U.S. and found that foreign 
banks are more likely to imitate local banks' asset strategy as institutional distance between 
the host country and the home country increases. 
These studies showed that MNCs imitate other firms' action in managing subsidiaries 
overseas. Although mimicking socially appropriate and prevailing practices enhances the 
firm's legitimacy within the institutional context, mimetic behavior does not necessarily mean 
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an economically rational decision (Barreto and Baden-Fuller, 2006; Oliver, 1997; Xu, Pan, 
and Beamish, 2004.). Mimicking dominant practices enhances legitimacy of the firm and 
increases the likelihood of its survival in uncertain situations (Chan et al., 2006; DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995; Yiu and Makino, 2002). In certain environments, however, 
firms do not have clear and complete information that a given practice is the best way to 
increase their efficiency (Deephouse, 1996; Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002). Because imitation 
of practices adopted by other firms at least enhances legitimacy and mitigates the liabilities of 
foreignness (Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002), the imitation by MNCs is often conducted without 
evidence that it increases organizational efficiency (Oliver, 1997; Westphal et al., 1997; Yiu 
and Makino, 2002). When they perceive strong social pressure to adopt dominant practices, 
firms may place priority on legitimacy seeking over organizational efficiency concerns 
(Westphal et al., 1997). Dominant practices in the host country, however, may be 
incompatible with the MNCs resources and capabilities because their resources and 
capabilities have been developed within the institutional context of the home country that is 
different from the host country's institutional context (Auh and Menguc, 2009; Brouthers, 
Brouthers, and Werner, 2008). Dominant and socially appropriate practices in the host 
country may not support the efficient exploitation of MNCs' resources and capabilities that 
are transferred from the home country (Clark and Lengnick-Hall, 2012).  
Consistent with these arguments, previous studies reported the negative relationship 
between isomorphic behavior and organizational performance. Zaheer (1995) surveyed 
Western and Japanese banks in the U.S. and Japan and found that foreign trading rooms that 
are distant from local practice perform better. In the context of Portuguese bank branching 
decisions, Barreto and Baden-Fuller (2006) showed the negative effect of isomorphic 
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behavior on the performance of banks. Westphal et al. (1997) used a dataset of hospitals in 
the U.S. and found that adoption of total quality management that are perceived as a 
normative practice increases the hospital's legitimacy but decreases its efficiency. These 
studies indicated that isomorphic behavior negatively affects organizational performance. 
Adequate knowledge about the economic consequences of isomorphic behavior by MNCs, 
however, has not been accumulated. There is still a research gap with regard to the 
examination of the effect of mimetic behavior by MNCs on organizational performance, 
which needs to be fulfilled. 
 
HYPOTHESES 
Legitimacy of foreign entrants is improved by successfully responding to the social 
pressure from the local context (Deephouse and Carter, 2005; Scott, 2008). By mimicking the 
prevailing practice in the host country, foreign firms can reduce the institutional pressure 
from the social context of the host country, gain local legitimacy, and mitigate liabilities of 
foreignness (Deephouse and Carter, 2005; Salomon and Wu, 2012; Xu et al., 2004; Zaheer, 
1995). However, efforts to adapt to the socially desirable practice may constrain the foreign 
firm's strategic discretion that is essential to raise efficiency and produce economic rents. 
Legitimacy seeking behavior may limit the strategic action of the foreign firm and prevent 
efficient and effective deployment of resources. Thus, the adoption of normatively rational 
action, which is the adoption of the socially desirable practice, makes it difficult for foreign 
firms to be economically rational (Oliver, 1997). In addition, the socially desirable practice 
may not be compatible with existing practices and resources of the foreign firm (Auh and 
Menguc, 2009). Due to misfit of the socially desirable practice with the resources and 
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practices of the foreign firm, its resources are not well exploited and its strategies are not well 
executed, which lower efficiency and erode economic rents. Thus, obtaining legitimacy 
incurs additional costs of adaptation to the host country's context, which undercut the 
efficiency of the firm (Yang, Su, and Fam, 2012). 
These arguments imply the negative relationship between the imitation of the socially 
prevailing practice regarding foreign subsidiary staffing and the performance of the foreign 
subsidiary. When operating in the host country, MNCs face uncertainty and lack information 
about the PCN ratio that increases efficiency and effectiveness of the foreign operation (Chan 
et al., 2006). Under the condition of uncertainty, MNCs may imitate the PCN ratio that 
prevails in the host country without having evidence that the imitation increases the 
subsidiary's efficiency (Deephouse, 1996; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Salomon and Wu, 
2012). The imitation of the dominant PCN ratio may improve legitimacy and acceptance of 
the foreign subsidiary and increase the likelihood of the subsidiary's survival through 
providing it with access to scarce local resources and information (Deephouse and Carter, 
2005; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Kostova and Zaheer, 1999; Schmidt and Sofka, 2009; 
Scott, 2008). Increased legitimacy may also improve host country nationals' (HCNs) morale 
and commitment to the foreign subsidiary (Bonache Perez and Pla-Barber, 2005; Law, Song, 
Wong, and Chen, 2009; Widmier, Brouthers, and Beamish, 2008). Increased legitimacy, 
however, may be obtained at the cost of efficiency (Barreto and Baden-Fuller, 2006; Martinez 
and Dacin, 1999: Oliver, 1997). MNCs assign PCNs to foreign subsidiaries, primarily 
expecting them to execute knowledge transfer and control roles (Gaur et al., 2007; Gong, 
2003; Tan and Mahoney, 2006). PCNs are used as a means to transfer firm-specific resources 
and capabilities to foreign subsidiaries because the resources and capabilities are embedded 
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in the organizational members (Wang, Tong, Chen and Kim, 2009). PCNs may have 
capabilities to exploit firm-specific resources in the host country to compete with local 
competitors and produce economic rents. They also share the values and goals of the parent 
firm and better understand the parent firm's strategies (Gong, 2003). This trait of PCNs 
enhances the parent firm's controllability over the foreign subsidiary and reduces agency 
costs (Gong, 2003). Although MNCs need to set an optimal PCN ratio to raise the 
effectiveness of knowledge transfer and control, the imitation of the prevailing PCN ratio to 
gain legitimacy prevents from setting the optimal PCN ratio and hinders the best use of 
PCNs' abilities. The dominant PCN ratio may not support the efficient and effective 
exploitation of the resources that are transferred from the parent firm and the implementation 
of the strategies assigned to the subsidiary (Clark and Lengnick-Hall, 2012). This inefficient 
deployment of human resources in search for local legitimacy is likely to lower the 
performance of the foreign subsidiaries.  These arguments lead us to propose the following 
hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The imitation of the dominant PCN ratio in the host country is 
negatively associated with the performance of the foreign subsidiary. 
 
Host countries where MNCs operate have a different institutional environment from the 
home country. Some host countries have similar institutions to the home country while others 
have dissimilar institutional environments that challenge MNCs. The degree of dissimilarity 
in institutions between two countries is termed institutional distance (Kostova and Zaheer, 
1999; Xu and Shenkar, 2002). Institutional distance between a host country and a home 
country presents a degree of a challenge that MNCs face in establishing and maintaining 
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legitimacy in the host country (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Kostova and Zaheer, 1999; Scott, 
2008; Xu and Shenkar, 2002). As institutional distance becomes great, the adoption of the 
socially desirable practice in the host country may cause significant loss of efficiency because 
the compatibility of MNCs' resources and practices with the local practices decreases 
(Brouthers et al., 2008; Kostova, 1999). Due to the incompatibility, the adoption of the 
dominant practice in institutionally distant countries may hinder the efficient implementation 
of the subsidiary's strategies (Clark and Lengnick-Hall, 2012). In addition, resources and 
practices of MNCs have been developed in their home country where institutional settings are 
different from host countries. Their resources and practices are designed to better produce 
economic rents within the home country institutions (Brouthers et al., 2008; Kostova, 1999). 
When institutional distance is great, incompatibility of MNCs’ resources and practices with 
the host country’s institutional context increases, which lowers efficiency in resource 
exploitation.     
In the case of low institutional distance, subsidiaries of MNCs may have less difficulty in 
dealing with the institution of the host country due to its similarity with the home country 
(Brouthers et al., 2008; Estrin, Baghdasaryan, and Meyer, 2009). The resources that have 
been developed within the institutional setting of the home country can better produce 
economic rents because of their compatibility with the institutional environments of the host 
country (Brouthers et al., 2008). Even if MNCs adopt the prevailing practice in the host 
country to seek local legitimacy, loss of efficiency in strategy implementation and resource 
exploitation may be marginal (Brouthers et al., 2008; Estrin et al., 2009). Although the 
dominant PCN ratio in the host country may not be optimal to exploit resources that are 
transferred from the parent firm and to implement the subsidiary’s strategies, the subsidiary 
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can manage to deal with the similar institutions to the home country and to mitigate 
inefficiency. Thus, in the case of institutionally similar host countries, imitating the prevailing 
PCN ratio may not incur large legitimacy costs and significant loss of efficiency. 
In comparison, when large institutional distance exists between the host country and the 
home country, the cost to gain legitimacy may increase (Brouthers et al., 2008; Kostova and 
Zaheer, 1999; Xu et al., 2004). MNCs may sacrifice significant efficiency to meet the local 
legitimacy requirements. When the MNC adopts the prevailing PCN ratio that is perceived to 
be acceptable in the institutionally distant host country, the effectiveness of knowledge 
transfer and control may erode because deviation from the optimal PCN ratio for efficient 
operations causes inefficiency. In addition, because of difficulty in dealing with institutions 
dissimilar to the home country, resource exploitation and strategy implementation undermine 
when the PCN ratio deviates from the optimal level. Thus, in institutionally distant host 
countries, the cost for legitimacy seeking is larger and the adoption of the dominant PCN 
ratio accompanies significant loss of efficiency. These arguments lead to the following 
hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The relationship between the imitation of the dominant PCN ratio in 
the host country and the performance of the foreign subsidiary is negatively moderated by the 
institutional distance between the host country and the home country. 
 
METHOD 
Sample and dataset 
The hypotheses were tested using a sample that consists of the foreign subsidiaries of 
Japanese listed firms. The subsidiaries in the sample were identified using the Kaigai 
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Shinshutsu Kigyo Soran (Overseas Japanese Companies Data) compiled by Toyo Keizai 
Shimposha. Using the 1997, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2007 and 2008 editions of the 
data source, this study developed a panel dataset. The observation period was from 1997 to 
2008. Primarily due to the unavailability of data and the entry and closure of foreign 
subsidiaries, the panel dataset of this study was unbalanced. Although the data source 
provided data on the foreign subsidiaries of unlisted firms, this study limited the sample to 
foreign subsidiaries owned by Japanese listed firms because the availability of the data 
regarding unlisted parent firms was limited. Both manufacturers and non-manufacturers were 
included in the initial sample. After removing the observations with missing data, the final 
sample included 3,284 subsidiaries across 63 countries. The number of observations in the 
panel dataset is 9,111. 
 
Measures 
The dependent variable of this study is the performance of foreign subsidiaries. Because 
the financial performance of foreign subsidiaries is often not disclosed or unavailable, this 
study adopted the labor productivity of foreign subsidiaries as a proxy for subsidiary 
performance by using available data (Gaur et al., 2007; Gong, 2003). The labor productivity 
was measured by foreign subsidiary sales per foreign subsidiary employee, which was 
log-transformed for analysis (Gaur et al., 2007; Gong, 2003). This study collected these data 
from the Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyo Soran. 
The PCN ratio was calculated as a ratio of the number of PCNs to the number of 
subsidiary employees. To operationalize the imitation of the dominant PCN ratio in the host 
country, this study employed the similar approach to Salomon and Wu (2012). First, this 
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study calculated the mean of the PCN ratio for each host country as the proxy for the 
dominant PCN ratio. Then, the mean of the PCN ratio for the host country was subtracted 
from the PCN ratio of the subsidiary operating in the country. The difference between the 
mean of the PCN ratio and the actual PCN ratio indicates deviation from the dominant PCN 
ratio. The absolute value of this difference was used as a proxy for the imitation of the 
dominant PCN ratio. To make larger scores represent the higher tendency to imitate the 
dominant PCN ratio, this study multiplied this absolute value by -1 (Salomon and Wu, 2012). 
To operationalize the institutional distance between the host country and the home country, 
this study used data from the World Bank’s Governance Indicators to measure the 
institutional distance, which is based on several hundred variables drawn from 37 separate 
data sources constructed by 31 organizations (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2005). The 
governance indicators consist of six institutional dimensions: voice and accountability, 
political instability and violence, government effectiveness, regulatory burden, rule of law, 
and control and corruption. To operationalize the institutional distance, this study adopted 
Ando and Paik’s (forthcoming) approach that is based on Kogut and Singh’s (1988) method 
to measure cultural distance. Formally, this study used the following formula: 
Institutional Distance j =   
where institutional distance j is the institutional distance between the host country j and 
Japan, Iij is country j’s score on the ith institutional dimension, Iih is Japan’s score on the ith 
institutional dimension, and  is the variance of the ith institutional dimension. To 
examine the validity of this proxy, correlation analyses were conducted between the 
institutional distance measure of this study and the other measures used in previous studies. 
The analyses demonstrated that the institutional distance variable of this study is significantly 
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and highly correlated with the other measures (r=.844, p<.001 for the measure by Chan, 
Isobe, and Makino (2008) and r=.739, p<.001 for the measure by Xu et al. (2004)).  
Because the performance of foreign subsidiaries is affected by the attributes of the 
subsidiary itself, the parent firm, the industry in which the subsidiary is engaged, and the host 
country, this study controlled for these effects. As control variables at the subsidiary level, 
this study included the ownership structure of the foreign subsidiary and the size of the 
foreign subsidiary. The ownership structure of the foreign subsidiary was measured as the 
ratio of equity ownership in the subsidiary owned by the parent firm. When the foreign 
subsidiary is owned by more than one parent firm from the home country, we collected data 
only from the primary parent firm. This approach is also the case for the other control 
variables due to unavailability of data. The size of the foreign subsidiary was calculated as 
the number of the subsidiary's employees divided by the number of the parent firm's 
employees. This variable indicates the relative size of the foreign subsidiary. As control 
variables at the parent firm level, the R&D intensity, the advertisement intensity, the foreign 
sales ratio, the host country experience, and the performance of the parent firm were 
incorporated. The R&D intensity of the parent firm was measured by the ratio of R&D 
expenditure to total sales. Similarly, the advertisement intensity was measured by the 
advertisement expenditure to total sales. The host country experience of the parent firm was 
measured as the sum of the operation years for the foreign subsidiaries operating in the host 
country. The scores for the host country experience were log-transformed when they were 
incorporated into the analysis. The foreign sales ratio of the parent firm was calculated as the 
ratio of foreign sales to total sales. To measure the performance of the parent firm, this study 
used operating income margin, which was calculated as the operating income on sales. To 
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control for industry effects, this study used the industry of the foreign subsidiary, which was a 
dummy variable that takes a value of 1 when the foreign subsidiary is engaged in the 
manufacturing sector and a value of 0 when it is engaged in the service sector. As explained 
below, this study adopts a fixed effect model to analyze the panel dataset. The fixed effect 
model cannot include time-invariant regressors. Therefore, to include a dummy variable that 
represents the industry of the foreign subsidiary, this study multiplied the industry dummy 
variable by the year dummy variables. To control for the host country effects, this study 
incorporated the GDP of the host country. The growth rate of GDP per capita was 
incorporated into the analysis.  
 
Analytical method 
This study adopted panel data models. Panel data models have an advantage over cross 
sectional models in that the panel data models can account for unobserved individual specific 
effects (in this study, unobserved individual subsidiary-specific effects) (Wooldridge, 2010). 
The F test was conducted to determine whether a fixed effect model would be more 
appropriate than a pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) model. The result of the F test 
rejected the null hypothesis that the individual effect does not vary across units (F=11.93, 
p<0.001). The rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that a fixed effect model is more 
appropriate than a pooled OLS model. Next, this study examined whether a random effect 
model would be more appropriate than a pooled OLS model. The result of the Breusch-Pagan 
Lagrangian multiplier test rejected the null hypothesis that all variance of the individual effect 
is zero (χ2=5669.21, p<0.001). This result indicates that a random effect model is more 
appropriate than a pooled OLS model. This study then compared a fixed effect model with a 
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random effect model. The result of the Hausman test rejected the null hypothesis that the 
estimates from a fixed effect model are not different from the estimates by a random effect 
model (χ2=294.21, p<0.001), which indicates that a fixed effect model is preferred. Based on 
these results, this study adopted a fixed effect model to test the hypotheses. Because this 
study adopted a fixed effect model, time invariant variables were not included in the analysis. 
 
RESULTS 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 1 and 2 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients of the variables used 
in this study. In the sample, the average PCN ratio was 9.4 percent and the average number of 
PCNs assigned to a foreign subsidiary was 4. The mean values for the foreign subsidiary's 
age and number of employees were 14.4 and 268, respectively. In the sample, 46.3 percent of 
the foreign subsidiaries were wholly owned. The correlation coefficients shown in Table 1 
were low overall. Thus, it is less likely that a severe multicollinearity problem is present. 
Table 2 reports the results of the fixed effect models. Model 1 included only the moderator 
and the control variables and in Model 2, the imitation of the dominant PCN ratio in the host 
country was added. Model 3 included the interaction between the imitation of the dominant 
PCN ratio in the host country and institutional distance between the host country and the 
home country. Model 2 showed that the imitation of the dominant PCN ratio has a significant 
and negative effect on foreign subsidiary performance (b = -0.720, p < .001). This result 
supports H1 that expects the negative relationship between the imitation of the dominant 
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PCN ratio and the subsidiary performance. Model 3 tested H2 that expects the negative 
moderating effect of institutional distance for the relationship between the imitation of the 
dominant PCN ratio and the subsidiary performance. The result showed that the coefficient of 
the interaction term is significant and negative (b = -.332, p < .05). The result lent support to 
H2. Figure 1 depicts a graphical presentation of the moderating effect of institutional distance 
for the relationship between the imitation of the dominant PCN ratio and the subsidiary 
performance.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Regarding the control variables, the foreign sales ratio, the host country experience, and 
the performance of the parent firm were consistently significant and positive through Models 
1 to 3. In comparison, the relative size of the foreign subsidiary was consistently significant 
and negative for all models. The results showed that institutional distance itself has the 
significant and negative impact on the subsidiary performance. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This study examined how isomorphic behavior regarding foreign subsidiary staffing 
influences subsidiary performance. The results obtained from the analysis of the panel data 
that consists of 3,284 foreign subsidiaries of Japanese firms indicates that setting the PCN 
ratio of the foreign subsidiary closer to the dominant PCN ratio in the host country negatively 
affects the subsidiary performance. The results also indicated that the relationship between 
the imitation of the dominant PCN ratio and subsidiary performance is negatively moderated 
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by institutional distance between the host country and the home country. In institutionally 
distant countries, the imitation of the prevailing PCN ratio more worsens the subsidiary 
performance. Although previous studies empirically showed that MNCs adopt isomorphic 
behavior in pursuit of legitimacy within the host country, the consequences of isomorphic 
behavior by MNCs have been uncovered. This study contributes to the literature by providing 
empirical evidence of the negative relationship between isomorphic behavior and 
performance in the context of international business. In addition to this direct effect, the study 
also empirically shows the moderating effect of institutional distance.  
The results of this study imply that isomorphic behavior in pursuit of legitimacy 
negatively affects the performance of foreign subsidiaries. Foreign subsidiaries are 
confronted with liabilities of foreignness and a lack of legitimacy in the host country. To 
mitigate institutional pressure and overcome liabilities of foreignness, foreign subsidiaries 
need to adopt the PCN ratio that is considered socially desirable in the host country. 
Mimicking the desirable PCN ratio may enhance the foreign subsidiary's acceptance in the 
host country and increase its legitimacy. However, the results of this study imply that gaining 
legitimacy is accompanied by the cost, which is loss of efficiency and effectiveness. The 
adoption of the dominant practice is normatively rational but the action is not necessarily 
economically rational (Oliver, 1997; Westphal et al., 1997). An economic imperative requires 
MNCs to set an optimal PCN ratio, which ensures the effective transfer and exploitation of 
resources and capabilities and the effective control over subsidiary operations. Legitimacy 
seeking through imitating the dominant PCN ratio, however, may lead to the deviation from 
the economically rational PCN ratio for the subsidiary. The deviation from the economically 
rational practice prevents the subsidiary from effective implementation of subsidiary 
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operations, which weakens competitiveness of the subsidiary. As a result, subsidiary 
performance lowers in exchange for increased legitimacy in the host country. The results of 
this study imply that legitimacy seeking through imitating other firms' practice is conducted 
at the cost of economic rent seeking. 
This study found the factor that moderates the negative relationship between isomorphic 
behavior and performance. The results showed that institutional distance between the host 
country and the home country alters a degree of efficiency loss caused by legitimacy seeking. 
The results indicate that the negative effect of the imitation of the dominant practice on 
subsidiary performance is greater as institutional distance increases. This implies that the loss 
of efficiency that is caused by legitimacy seeking is greater when the foreign subsidiary 
operates in an institutionally distant country. In institutionally similar environments, MNCs 
may perceive less legitimacy pressure (Yang et al., 2012). In addition, they can better deal 
with local institutions because of the similarity to the home country. In such an environment, 
foreign subsidiaries may marginally lose efficiency even if they pursue legitimacy by 
mimicking the PCN ratio of other foreign firms. Thus, even though the dominant practice is 
away from the subsidiary's optimal PCN ratio, the subsidiary can manage to exploit resources 
and capabilities and produce economic rents. In the case where institutional distance is low, it 
is likely that foreign subsidiaries can simultaneously seek legitimacy and economic efficiency 
with less legitimacy cost. In comparison, MNCs need to gain legitimacy by adopting the 
dominant PCN ratio when they face greater institutional distance. However, the results 
indicate that legitimacy seeking in institutionally distant countries comes with greater loss of 
efficiency. Due to deviation from an optimal PCN ratio for the subsidiary, MNCs cannot well 
exploit their resources and capabilities and well maintain controllability over foreign 
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operations, which lowers subsidiary performance. Thus, in institutionally distant countries, 
legitimacy is gained in exchange for greater legitimacy costs. The results of this study 
suggest that the cost of legitimacy seeking varies depending on institutional distance between 
the host country and the home country. 
Managers in charge of foreign subsidiary staffing need to consider a cost side of 
legitimacy seeking. Adopting the socially desirable practice may help the foreign subsidiary 
gain legitimacy from the host country. However, it is accompanied by loss of economic 
efficiency. For the subsidiary to successfully implement strategies assigned by the parent firm, 
it is required to set an optimal PCN ratio that may deviate from the socially desirable practice. 
Adoption of the optimal ratio may, in turn, undermine acceptance and legitimacy within the 
host country. Managers need to balance legitimacy against efficiency. Balancing these two is 
more difficult in institutionally distant countries. When facing great institutional distance in 
the host country, the subsidiary incurs more legitimacy costs. In institutionally distant 
countries, however, gaining legitimacy is more important for the subsidiary to survive (Xu et 
al., 2004). Therefore, MNCs operating in institutionally distant countries may need to acquire 
local knowledge and familiarize themselves with local institutions to better balance 
legitimacy against economic efficiency.  
This study is subject to several limitations. The sample used in this study consists solely of 
foreign subsidiaries of Japanese firms. This research design limits the generalizability of the 
findings from this study. The results obtained from this study may change when data of 
European or U.S. MNCs are used. Thus, future research may replicate this study using 
datasets of MNCs from other countries. This study operationalized a dominant PCN ratio as 
the average PCN ratio of foreign subsidiaries in each host country. Then, this study calculated 
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the absolute difference between the PCN ratio of each subsidiary and the host country's 
average score. This operationalization is a similar approach to Salomon and Wu (2012). 
However, future studies need to improve the operationalization of a dominant practice and a 
degree of isomorphic behavior. In addition, because of unavailability of data, we used labor 
productivity as a proxy for subsidiary performance. The measure may capture limited aspects 
of performance of foreign subsidiaries. Future studies may use other measures of subsidiary 
performance such as ROI or ROA. Finally, this study only considered institutional distance as 
a moderator for the relationship between isomorphic behavior and subsidiary performance. 
Future studies need to extend this study by exploring another moderator. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients 
 
Note: Correlations equal or greater than |0.021| are significant at p<0.05.  
  
Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
1 Subsidiary Performance 5.322 1.693 1.000
2 Imitation of the dominant practice -0.113 0.122 -0.275 1.000
3 Institutional distance 1.184 1.208 -0.559 0.301 1.000
4 Ownership in subsidiary 0.667 0.381 0.144 -0.110 -0.101 1.000
5 Size of subsidiary 0.058 0.207 -0.215 0.046 0.119 0.000 1.000
6 R&D intensity 0.033 0.028 0.148 0.030 -0.112 -0.044 -0.073 1.000
7 Advertisement intensity 0.011 0.018 0.022 0.016 -0.088 -0.037 -0.019 0.078 1.000
8 Foreign sales ratio 0.307 0.278 0.178 0.037 -0.088 -0.028 -0.044 0.210 0.010 1.000
9 Host country experience 3.021 0.905 0.136 -0.070 -0.127 -0.155 -0.049 0.153 0.025 0.116 1.000
10 Parent firm performance 0.053 0.047 0.011 0.040 -0.030 0.029 0.031 0.131 0.111 0.095 -0.086 1.000
11 Growth of GDP 3.639 4.217 -0.222 0.095 0.398 -0.015 0.060 -0.084 -0.048 0.064 -0.005 0.010 1.000
12 Year 99 * manufacturer 0.043 0.204 -0.112 0.051 0.036 -0.044 0.021 0.028 -0.020 -0.235 -0.042 0.035 -0.322 1.000
13 Year 01 * manufacturer 0.076 0.264 -0.154 0.083 0.111 -0.049 0.027 -0.029 -0.054 -0.047 -0.041 -0.062 0.087 -0.061 1.000
14 Year 02 * manufacturer 0.085 0.278 -0.161 0.083 0.140 -0.057 0.036 -0.046 -0.030 -0.045 -0.029 -0.011 -0.092 -0.065 -0.087 1.000
15 Year 03 * manufacturer 0.080 0.271 -0.153 0.063 0.084 -0.039 0.060 -0.015 -0.019 -0.027 -0.028 -0.135 0.023 -0.063 -0.084 -0.089 1.000
16 Year 05 * manufacturer 0.073 0.260 -0.140 0.059 0.109 -0.037 0.077 -0.019 -0.033 0.009 0.019 0.018 0.134 -0.060 -0.080 -0.085 -0.082 1.000
17 Year 07 * manufacturer 0.077 0.267 -0.107 0.042 0.094 -0.006 0.095 -0.079 -0.024 0.040 0.020 0.057 0.160 -0.062 -0.083 -0.088 -0.085 -0.081 1.000
18 Year 08 * manufacturer 0.085 0.278 -0.100 0.044 0.121 -0.006 0.062 -0.053 -0.055 0.056 0.038 0.060 0.219 -0.065 -0.087 -0.092 -0.089 -0.085 -0.088 1.000
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Table 2. Results of fixed effect models 
 
*** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
b S.E. b S.E. b S.E.
Imitation of the dominant practice -0.720 *** 0.132 -0.460 ** 0.176
Institutional distance -0.088 * 0.044 -0.100 * 0.044 -0.129 ** 0.046
Imitation of the dominant practice *
Institutional distance -0.332 * 0.148
Ownership in subsidiary -0.082 0.069 -0.087 0.069 -0.088 0.069
Size of subsidiary -0.446 *** 0.082 -0.447 *** 0.082 -0.446 *** 0.082
R&D intensity 0.530 1.193 0.640 1.190 0.686 1.190
Advertisement intensity 0.888 2.938 0.592 2.931 0.685 2.930
Foreign sales ratio 0.237 *** 0.043 0.239 *** 0.043 0.241 *** 0.043
Host country experience 0.269 *** 0.032 0.261 *** 0.032 0.257 *** 0.032
Parent firm performance 2.159 *** 0.288 2.190 *** 0.287 2.190 *** 0.287
Growth of GDP 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Year 99 * manufacturer -0.241 * 0.095 -0.230 * 0.095 -0.232 * 0.095
Year 01 * manufacturer -0.267 ** 0.087 -0.253 ** 0.087 -0.248 ** 0.087
Year 02 * manufacturer -0.196 * 0.086 -0.185 * 0.086 -0.181 * 0.086
Year 03 * manufacturer -0.229 ** 0.086 -0.222 ** 0.086 -0.223 ** 0.086
Year 05 * manufacturer -0.186 * 0.086 -0.177 * 0.086 -0.177 * 0.086
Year 07 * manufacturer -0.046 0.087 -0.040 0.087 -0.041 0.087
Year 08 * manufacturer 0.078 0.088 0.081 0.088 0.078 0.088
Constant 4.542 *** 0.135 4.496 *** 0.135 4.542 *** 0.136
R squared
Within 0.090 0.095 0.096
Between 0.156 0.201 0.206
Overall 0.181 0.223 0.228
F 36.111 *** 35.898 *** 34.206 ***
Observation 9111 9111 9111
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Figure 1. The interaction effect of the imitation of the dominant practice and the 
institutional distance. 
 
Note: High institutional distance represents the mean + one standard deviation and low 
institutional distance represents the mean - one standard deviation.  
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